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The World Bank Economic Review Advance Access published online on May 9, 2007
The World Bank Economic Review, doi:10.1093/wber/lhm005
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© The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Land Tenure, Investment Incentives, and the Choice of Techniques: Evidence from Nicaragua

Oriana Bandiera

Oriana Bandiera is assistant professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and research affiliate at the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and at the Bureau for Research and the Analysis of Economic Development; her email address is o.bandiera{at}lse.ac.uk

JEL codes: D23, D82, O12, Q15

The choice of cultivation techniques is a key determinant of agricultural productivity and has important consequences for income growth and poverty reduction in developing countries. Household data from Nicaragua are used to show that the choice of cultivation technique depends on farmers' tenure status even when techniques are observable and contractible. In particular, tree crops are less likely to be grown on rented than on owner-cultivated plots. Further evidence indicates that the result follows from landlords' inability or unwillingness to commit to long-term tenancy contracts rather than from agency costs due to risk aversion or limited liability.


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