© 1990 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
research-article |
Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets
Stanford University Stanford, California
A major problem for institutional lenders is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of the funds so that the likelihood of repayment is enhanced. One partial solution is peer monitoring: having neighbors who are in a good position to monitor the borrower be required to pay a penalty if the borrower goes bankrupt. Peer monitoring is largely responsible for the successful financial performance of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and of similar group lending programs elsewhere. But peer monitoring has a cost. It transfers risk from the bank, which is in a better position to bear risk, to the cosigner. In a simple model of peer monitoring in a competitive credit market, this article demonstrates that the transfer of risk leads to an improvement in borrowers' welfare.
![]()
CiteULike
Connotea
Del.icio.us What's this?
This article has been cited by other articles:
![]() |
A. Sasson and O. Fjeldstad Information-mediated network effects: network composition and customer benefit in the presence of information asymmetry Strategic Organization, November 1, 2009; 7(4): 355 - 386. [Abstract] [PDF] |
||||
![]() |
T. Jakimow The Rationale of Self-help in Development Interventions: A Case Study of a Self-help Group Programme in Tamil Nadu Journal of South Asian Development, January 1, 2007; 2(1): 107 - 124. [Abstract] [PDF] |
||||
![]() |
J. Hietalahti and M. Linden Socio-economic impacts of microfinance and repayment performance: a case study of the Small Enterprise Foundation, South Africa Progress in Development Studies, July 1, 2006; 6(3): 201 - 210. [Abstract] [PDF] |
||||
![]() |
C.-k. R. Hung Rules and Actions: Determinants of Peer Group and Staff Actions in Group-Based Microcredit Programs in the United States Economic Development Quarterly, February 1, 2006; 20(1): 75 - 96. [Abstract] [PDF] |
||||



