The World Bank Economic Review Advance Access published online on January 5, 2008
The World Bank Economic Review, doi:10.1093/wber/lhm019
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Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies
JEL Codes: D73, D74
The inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society—a previously unexplored determinant of civil war—causes both elected and unelected governments to pursue public policies that leave citizens worse off and more prone to revolt. Noncredible political actors are also less able to build counterinsurgency capacity. Popular dissatisfaction with rulers reduces the costs to counterinsurgents of overthrowing regimes, discouraging rulers from building counterinsurgency capacity in the first place; lack of credibility prevents rulers from writing contracts with counterinsurgents that maximize counterinsurgency effort. Empirical tests across numerous subsamples using various measures of political credibility support the conclusion that broad political credibility ranks at least as high as social fractionalization and natural resource rents as a cause of conflict.
Philip Keefer is a Lead Research Economist in the Development Research Group at the World Bank; his email address is pkeefer{at}worldbank.org. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Cristina Abodea, as well as comments from participants in seminars at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Stanford University, the University of Lund, and the University of Basel.