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The World Bank Economic Review Advance Access originally published online on January 5, 2008
The World Bank Economic Review 2008 22(1):33-61; doi:10.1093/wber/lhm019
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Right arrow D72 - Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Right arrow D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Right arrow D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Right arrow F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
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© The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies

Philip Keefer

Philip Keefer is a Lead Research Economist in the Development Research Group at the World Bank; his email address is pkeefer{at}worldbank.org

JEL Codes: D73, D74

The inability of political actors to make credible promises to broad segments of society—a previously unexplored determinant of civil war—causes both elected and unelected governments to pursue public policies that leave citizens worse off and more prone to revolt. Noncredible political actors are also less able to build counterinsurgency capacity. Popular dissatisfaction with rulers reduces the costs to counterinsurgents of overthrowing regimes, discouraging rulers from building counterinsurgency capacity in the first place; lack of credibility prevents rulers from writing contracts with counterinsurgents that maximize counterinsurgency effort. Empirical tests across numerous subsamples using various measures of political credibility support the conclusion that broad political credibility ranks at least as high as social fractionalization and natural resource rents as a cause of conflict.


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